Abstract
This Article assumes an intersectional and feminist perspective to argue that being human should not be the qualification for justice or legal personhood. Drawing from feminist analyses of animal theory, and various strands of critical theory, this Article argues that feminists and other advocates of human rights, for whom interrogating constructs of gender, race, culture, sexuality, etc., are important, must also attend to species difference and the treatment of nonhuman animals to be consistent and effective in their discursive critiques and legal interventions. It does so by examining species difference as a social construction and the similarities and interconnections in the "logic" supporting intra-human hierarchies with the discourses commonly adduced to exclude nonhuman animals from ethical and legal consideration.
Recommended Citation
Maneesha Deckha,
The Salience of Species Difference for Feminist Theory,
17 Hastings Women's L.J. 1
(2006).
Available at: https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hwlj/vol17/iss1/2