UC Law Science and Technology Journal
Abstract
This Note argues that the specific intent requirement for § 271(b) should be abolished. It shows that the language of § 271(b) does not provide textual support for the specific intent requirement. Additionally, it argues that the specific intent requirement is contrary to early case law before the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act and is in conflict with many aspects of patent law including the utilitarian policies, the doctrine of equivalents and basic risk allocation. Finally, this Note demonstrates that the overlapping scope of § 271(b) and § 271(c) necessitates the specific intent requirement because Congress intended § 271(b) with its generic language to cover a broader scope of indirect infringement than the specific situation of § 271(c). Instead, inducement of § 271(b) should be considered as a strict liability claim.
Recommended Citation
Soonbok Lee,
Induced Infringement as a Strict Liability Claim: Abolishment of the Specific Intent Requirement,
4 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 381
(2012).
Available at: https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_science_technology_law_journal/vol4/iss2/4