The WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission: An Unwise Extension of Extrajudicial Roles

Authors

Andrew D. Herman

Abstract

In the past decade, Congress has enlisted the Federal Judiciary to deal with issues ranging from the appointment of special prosecutors to the development of standardized sentencing guidelines. One area of particular focus has been international trade. In November, 1995, then Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole introduced Senate Bill 1438 (S. 1438) which' calls for a five-member panel, comprised of active federal circuit judges, to review all World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute resolution decisions adverse to the United States' economic interests.

In this Note, the author employs the separation of powers doctrine to examine both the constitutionality and the wisdom of utilizing federal judges to review WTO decisions. The author delineates the long-standing practice of extra-judicial service by federal judges. Next, by comparing this proposal with the Supreme Court's decisions addressing extrajudicial activity, the author concludes that the Court would likely uphold the constitutionality of S. 1438. However, the wisdom of the proposed Commission is not as apparent. The policy implications of embroiling federal judges in the politics of the WTO and the greater debate over United States' sovereignty would have a wholly detrimental effect on the judicial branch.

Recommended Citation

Andrew D. Herman, The WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission: An Unwise Extension of Extrajudicial Roles, 47 Hastings L.J. 1635 (1996).
Available at: https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol47/iss5/7