Scapegoat for the Trade Deficit: Does EEC Antitrust Treatment of Joint Ventures Place the United States at a Competitive Disadvantage

Authors

Dana W. Hayter

Abstract

This Note critiques a proposal by Professors Jorde and Teece of the University of California at Berkeley, California, to exempt joint ventures from the United States' antitrust laws. The professors contend that their proposal emulates the EEC exemption procedure under Article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome, and that the United States must adopt their proposal to compete with the EEC. This Note questions both assertions. The Jorde and Teece proposal would exempt a wide variety of agreements between competitors from civil and criminal liability with a minimum of initial review, without empirical support, and with little subsequent supervision. By contrast, the EEC procedure relies upon the Community's experience with the competitive effects of certain narrow classes of joint venture agreements, requires that consumers receive a fair share of the benefits of an exemption, and involves substantial governmental review and supervision. Further, the Note proposes that Congress temporarily amend the United States National Cooperative Research Act to cover joint production agreements, so that empirical data may be gathered to determine whether socially beneficial joint ventures are deterred by fear of antitrust liability in the United States.

Recommended Citation

Dana W. Hayter, Scapegoat for the Trade Deficit: Does EEC Antitrust Treatment of Joint Ventures Place the United States at a Competitive Disadvantage, 16 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 391 (1993).
Available at: https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol16/iss3/4