U.S. mandatory disclosure requirements are far more demanding in breadth and detail than those of Japan. However, as this Article suggests, a good deal of diversity, and even laxity, can coexist within mutually agreed upon principles for fair competitive regulation. This Article attempts to provide a framework for efficient regulatory competition between the two countries' markets by focusing on "managerial opportunism"!-an expression identifying a wide range of possible concerns that may influence an issuer's choice among markets. The author suggests appropriate measures for disclosure could minimize differences between securities markets, and as a result minimize the role managerial opportunism plays in an issuer's choice of securities markets.
James D. Cox,
Regulatory Competition in Securities Markets: An Approach for Reconciling Japanese and United States Disclosure Philosophies,
16 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 149
Available at: https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol16/iss2/2