Voluntary Restraint Agreements: A Threat to Representative Democracy

Authors

Kevin C. Kennedy

Abstract

This Article explores the discretionary powers exercised by the executive branch in the field of international trade. It initially describes the discretionary powers of the executive branch under United States trade laws. The Article then turns to a consideration of the executive branch's power to negotiate voluntary trade restraint agreements with foreign trading partners. The author asserts that these negotiations are undertaken without congressional delegation of power; the executive branch is thus engaging in unconstitutional acts. Finally, the author considers several proposals for modifying trade relief law to properly restore congressional responsibility.

Recommended Citation

Kevin C. Kennedy, Voluntary Restraint Agreements: A Threat to Representative Democracy, 11 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (1987).
Available at: https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol11/iss1/1