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UC Law Environmental Journal

Abstract

The Permit Streamlining Act (PSA) ensures swift resolution of permit applications by simplifying the processing of permits for development projects. To achieve this end, the California Legislature set forth various time limits within which local permitting bodies must approve or disapprove of a complete application. After the time expires, the PSA provides that a project shall be “deemed approved” so long as affected landowners are given “public notice required by law.” The PSA’s statutory framework butts up against Horn v. County of Ventura—a 1979 California Supreme Court case that is inconsistent with California due process principles. The Horn decision has led to the appellate courts’ split that this paper explores. It begins by detailing the differing treatment of the PSA’s public notice provision between appellate courts. Some courts have treated this as adequate for due process purposes; others disagree. It next deconstructs the Horn decision, demonstrating that its due-process theory is dicta and therefore not binding. Finally, it suggests that Horn’s due-process dicta is inconsistent with California’s due-process jurisprudence because it fails to balance the competing interests at stake. And, even if Horn’s due-process dicta struck a reasonable balance in the 1970s, the balance weighs differently in favor of the governmental interests at issue today, considering the Legislature’s priority in addressing the housing crisis. This paper’s primary goal is to unfold the appellate courts’ split and save the PSA from utter curtailment, so that it remains free to fulfill its legislative purpose: streamlining the permitting process to prevent unjust governmental delays that threaten housing development.

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