‘Cruel and Unusual’ in 1689, 1791, and 1868: Shifts in Incorporation

Authors

Gregory Velloze

Abstract

Recently, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the scholarly debate over whether to apply the historical understanding of the Bill of Rights as ratified in 1791 or as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. This acknowledgment raises two important issues with regards to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. First, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was copied from the English Bill of Rights in 1689, generating a third, additional time period relevant to its historical understanding. Second, the more textualist framework of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause allows for more relatively bounded language and interpretation, which could remain unchanged through each time period. And if the Eighth Amendment’s textual principles could remain intact, even while its expected applications changed over time, each incorporation would represent a shift in construction rather than in a shift in interpretation. As such, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause maintains its longstanding function of prohibiting punishments that are unjustifiably more severe (cruel) and contrary to the ordinary standards of law (unusual) despite changing expected applications against extralegal courts, federal overreach, and discrimination.

Recommended Citation

Gregory Velloze, ‘Cruel and Unusual’ in 1689, 1791, and 1868: Shifts in Incorporation, 52 Hastings Const. L.Q. 27 (2025).
Available at: https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol52/iss2/4