UC Law Constitutional Quarterly
Abstract
Currently, 41% of inmates on death row in the United States are Black, even though Black people make up only 13.6% of the total population in the country. Additionally, the data has repeatedly shown that states that do not have the death penalty have lower murder rates than states that do. Despite these disparities, more than half of states in the United States continue to allow capital punishment in some form as an alternative to a life sentence. These disparities were further exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Payne v. Tennessee, which allowed prosecutors to introduce victim impact evidence in the sentencing phase of death penalty proceedings. Due to the widespread implementation of the death penalty across the states in this country, it is unlikely that the Court would abolish the death penalty in the near future. Thus, a compromise to alleviate some of the inequalities in capital punishment, without removing it in its entirety, is for the Supreme Court to reverse its decision in Payne and hold that admission of victim impact evidence is unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. The central aim of this paper is to demonstrate that victim impact evidence has no place in death penalty sentencing proceedings because it has no bearing on the defendant’s culpability and moreover it has a prejudicial effect on the defendant’s verdict. First, I will argue that victim impact evidence is irrelevant for a juror’s determination of a defendant’s culpability for three reasons (1) the evidence shifts the jury’s attention from the defendant’s background to the victim’s background; (2) a defendant is often unaware of their victim’s personal circumstances; and (3) a defendant’s introduction of victim impact evidence to show the victim’s less favorable characteristics often does not influence a defendant’s culpability. Next, I will demonstrate that victim impact evidence has a prejudicial effect on the defendant because of the arbitrariness of several factors including (1) whether the victim’s family can articulate their emotions in a way that resonates with the jury; (2) jurors’ lack of cultural competence; and (3) viewpoint and racial bias in jury selection. Thus, to reduce some of the disparities in a criminal system that is already unequal, it is imperative for the Court to prohibit victim impact evidence in death penalty proceedings.
Recommended Citation
Fernanda Gonzalez,
The Inadmissibility of Victim Impact Evidence,
51 Hastings Const. L.Q. 423
(2024).
Available at: https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol51/iss3/6