UC Law Constitutional Quarterly
Abstract
Modern technology has changed the way we look at pregnancy. Some parties seeking to utilize new technologies have entered into gestational surrogacy contracts, where a genetically unrelated woman acts as a surrogate, gestating an implanted embryo. While surrogacy contracts allow many people to parent in situations that might not otherwise be possible, they often fail to account for the important Constitutional interests of the gestational surrogate. This note argues that the idea of motherhood must be reconceputalized in the gestational surrogacy contract, so that the rights accorded to the surrogate are recognized as rights distinct from those of the "mother." By doing so, the rights of the surrogate to control her pregnancy and bodily autonomy are accorded due respect.
Recommended Citation
Alayna Ohs,
Power of Pregnancy: Examining Constitutional Rights in a Gestational Surrogacy Contract,
29 Hastings Const. L.Q. 339
(2002).
Available at: https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol29/iss2/4