Selling Antitrust

Herbert Hovenkamp

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Antitrust enforcers and its other defenders have never done a good job of selling their field to the public. That is not entirely their fault. Antitrust is inherently technical, and a less engaging discipline to most people than, say, civil rights or criminal law. The more serious problem is that when the general press does talk about antitrust policy, it naturally gravitates toward the fringes, both the far right and the far left. Extreme rhetoric makes for better press than the day-to-day operations of a technical enterprise. The extremes are often stated in overdramatized black-and-white terms that avoid the real world subtleties that make science more fact dependent but also more useful.

Both extreme positions generally favor lower output as a solution to antitrust problems. The result is higher prices and fewer jobs. The right shrugs at higher prices because of its faith that there are offsetting efficiencies in production. The left simply accepts that higher prices benefit smaller competitors, its preferred protected class. On employment, the extreme right does not really care, because suppressing labor power was part of a bigger neoliberal agenda. The negative impact on jobs remains a major blind spot for the left, however, which claims to support worker rights but ends up advocating policies that do much more harm than good.

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INTRODUCTION

Antitrust’s promoters have never done a particularly good job selling their field to the public. That is not entirely their fault. Antitrust is inherently technical, and a less engaging discipline to most people than, say, civil rights or criminal law. The more serious problem is that when the general press talks about antitrust policy, it naturally gravitates toward the fringes, both the far right and today, increasingly, the far left. Extreme rhetoric makes for better press than the day-to-day operations of a technical enterprise. The extremes are often stated in overdramatized, black-and-white terms that avoid the worldly subtleties that make the economics of antitrust law not only more complex and fact dependent, but also more useful. Richard Hofstadter captured the issue well in his iconic 1965 essay, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement? He noted that, for decades, antitrust was filled with rhetorical fervor aimed mainly at a poorly defined group of firms called “trusts.” During that period, however, antitrust law accomplished very little. When antitrust law finally peeled the rhetoric away and developed a coherent set of enforcement rules, the public lost interest. Nevertheless, in the process, antitrust was actually able to get something done.

A good illustration of this is the use of “winner-take-all” rhetoric to describe the big digital platforms. The press loves the suggestion that these firms naturally gravitate toward permanent monopoly status. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth, as suggested by Facebook’s recent stock market crash. The crash was induced in substantial part by the entry and rapid growth of TikTok, which has been rapidly peeling users away from Facebook. Explaining “differentiated” entry to the press has proven difficult, however—although it need not be. The theory of natural monopoly, from which the term “winner-take-all” was derived, was limited to undifferentiated firms such as utilities who faced identical demand but had declining costs. Neither Facebook nor any similarly situated platform is likely to face new entry from a clone. Rather, it will (and did) come from a rival who produces a different but overlapping product.

Centrist antitrust is flanked by two outspoken extremes. Both groups live primarily in the past, although in different parts of it. Antitrust’s neoliberal right grew out of a reaction to the New Deal that developed in the 1940s through the 1970s, prior to the rise of robust and testable models of imperfect competition. The principal targets were the theories of oligopoly and monopolistic

competition that at the time were considered novel but untestable. Today, that is no longer the case. Not only are they robust and testable, but they have largely displaced older perfect competition models that the Chicago School defended so aggressively from the 1940s through the 1970s.

Antitrust’s extreme left depends on ideas developed decades earlier, with exaggerated but simple views about the harms caused by big firms, yet largely disregarding the welfare of consumers and labor—two enormous beneficiaries of competitive markets. This position, sometimes referred to as “Progressive” or “Neo-Brandeisian,” attempts to get back to an imagined view of Progressive antitrust policy. It does not accurately represent the views of the actual Progressives. Even if it did, there is no obvious need to return to it, any more than a need to return to, say, the gold standard or mandatory balanced budgets.

The use of the term “Progressive” to describe the policies of the new antitrust left is historically unfortunate. In fact, no era has contributed more to modern antitrust doctrine than the original Progressive era, and the vast majority of its contributions were pro-enforcement. Among its contributions was partial equilibrium analysis, which breaks the economy up into small segments, or “markets,” for purposes of study. This microeconomic doctrine led to the development of the “relevant market” in antitrust law for estimating power. Another Progressive development was the use of tools for measuring industrial concentration as a device for assessing industry competitiveness. Yet another was the concept of entry barriers, in contrast to the classical presumption that new entry is both easy and certain to discipline monopoly pricing. Additionally, there was the development of a more technical theory of costs, including the idea that industries with high fixed costs are more problematic and more conducive to unstable competition and cartels, and thus warrant closer scrutiny. The new Progressives have purloined the name while ignoring most of the valuable antitrust enforcement tools that the actual Progressives developed.

How should antitrust be marketed to a press and readership whose principal common characteristic is a short attention span? The remainder of this Essay highlights four positions that are harmful as a matter of antitrust law. They are attractive to the public, however, because each of them can be declared on a post-it note. The corrections unfortunately require both facts and explanation.


5. Id.


8. Id. at 9.
I. SELLING ANTITRUST: DEBUNKING THE BIG FOUR

A. THE CONSUMER WELFARE PRINCIPLE

The first is the misuse of antitrust’s “consumer welfare” principle, which has produced a great deal of resistance from people who do not understand its meaning. The misunderstanding is largely the fault of Robert Bork, who borrowed a general welfare concept from economics and then renamed it “consumer” welfare. Rhetorically, that was a tour de force and contributed a great deal to its popularity. It also contributed to lower output and higher prices as a result of practices that should have been condemned but were not. “Output” is measured by quantity, quality, or innovation, all three of which contribute to consumer value. Facilitating higher output both reduces prices and improves product quality, as sellers need to reach more buyers.

The fundamental problem with Bork’s vision of consumer welfare was that he included producer profits as part of the welfare of consumers. For example, if a practice produced $500 in consumer losses but $600 in producer gains, Bork could label it as promoting “consumer welfare” even though the consumers were actually losers. The impact of this mislabeling has shown up prominently in Supreme Court opinions. For example, the dissenters in *FTC v. Actavis, Inc.* could proclaim that the goal of antitrust law is to improve consumer welfare even as they would have approved of a practice—pay-for-delay pharmaceutical patent settlements—that led to higher drug prices and harmed actual consumers.\(^9\) The same is true of the majority opinion in *Ohio v. Amex Express Co.*, which declared support for the consumer welfare principle even while approving a practice that imposed high consumer prices on every affected transaction.\(^10\)

Bork’s definition of “consumer welfare” as including producer profits was his way of addressing practices that could be efficient even as they created a monopoly. Mergers are a commonly given example, but there are others. Bork borrowed a very well-known figure from economist Oliver Williamson as his model. A challenged practice might create a monopoly, producing deadweight loss, designated at A\(_1\) in the figure below, but also reducing costs, as shown in area A\(_2\). Bork’s consumer welfare principle stated that this practice should be approved if the cost savings area was larger than the deadweight loss area. Bork used the figure below and described its meaning in *The Antitrust Paradox.*\(^11\)

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The one thing Bork did not describe in any detail was the relationship between $O_1$ and $O_2$ at the bottom of this figure. The bottom line represents output, and $O_2$ in the figure is about half the distance between the zero point and $O_1$. In other words, this particular practice reduced output by roughly half, even as it was generating enormous efficiencies. The actual output reduction could be greater or less than half, depending on the shape of the demand curve and the extent of the cost savings.

One thing that Bork did say about output was that “any efficiencies associated with a firm’s size are very likely to outweigh any restriction of output on the consumer welfare scale.”\(^\text{12}\) The statement is mystifying, but one thing it reveals is how little Bork knew about business. He appeared to think that the efficiencies that resulted from larger firm size came from the number of square feet in a plant or the number of facilities a firm owns, or some other marker that he associated with a “firm’s size.” But large size produces efficiencies mainly by increasing output.

This is a case of what Ronald Coase famously called “blackboard economics,” where the geometry makes sense when you draw it with a piece of chalk, but has little or no correspondence to the real world.\(^\text{13}\) Bork never addressed the eminently important policy question of exactly what type of situation produces these results. The most important economy that firms achieve through mergers or joint ventures is economies of scale, but these generally accrue at greater rather than lesser output. Further, per unit fixed costs vary inversely with output. For example, a firm that has fixed costs of one-thousand dollars and produces two-hundred units has per unit fixed costs of five dollars.

\(^{12}\) Id. at 179.

Yet if that firm reduces its output to one-hundred units while its fixed costs remain unchanged, its per unit fixed costs rise to ten dollars. So, the monopolies that Bork must have had in mind were not firms with substantial fixed costs. But in that case, what was the source of durable monopoly?

Finally, but too often forgotten, is the impact of output on labor. Labor is largely a variable cost, and at the lower end of the pay scale, it is almost entirely a variable cost. As a result, price-increasing and output-reducing practices harm not only consumers, but also hurt labor—perhaps significantly. This remains one of the biggest blind spots in the Neo-Brandeisian movement: it legitimately states a strong concern for practices such as noncompete clauses that limit labor mobility, but ignores the far bigger labor issue that affects many more workers, which is what happens to jobs when excessive protectionism for small business results in lower product output and decreases the need for labor.

The press typically does not have the patience for all of these fine points. To the extent they relate “consumer welfare” to “Bork,” they acquire the impression that consumer welfare is some kind of right-wing conspiracy to harm people in order to preserve high profits for firms. Properly defined, however, consumer welfare favors maximum sustainable output, which is consistent with competitive markets and benefits both consumers and suppliers, including workers. It manifestly does not favor high profits. The concept of maximum sustainable output is not a license to produce cheap goods. To the contrary, satisfying those needs is a form of output to the extent firms prefer better or more innovative products.

Higher output solutions can harm competitors, however, and for that reason various small business interests have opposed them. It is typically bad for rivals when a firm increases its production, improves the quality of its product, or invests in innovation. Small business interests raised these concerns during the formative years of antitrust enforcement: during the New Deal, during the 1960s, and finally, now. Brandeis’s name is so often mentioned today because he was a champion of small business, including of legal rules that imposed higher costs on larger firms for the benefit of smaller ones. For example, one of his well-known dissents expressed support for state laws passed at the behest of small business that taxed chain stores at progressively increasing rates as the number of stores increased. In fact, he conceded that a possible effect of the statute was to make it unprofitable for the chains to do business in the state.

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15. Id. at 21.
18. Id. at 541 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The statute seeks to do this by subjecting the latter to financial handicaps which may conceivably compel their withdrawal from the state.”).
by retailer groups was a way of preventing larger firms from selling at lower prices. The same concerns were reflected in the 1960s when the government condemned the Brown Shoe merger because it resulted in either “lower prices or in higher quality for the same price,” harming smaller business competitors who could not compete. Consumer welfare as maximum sustainable output is consistent with, although it does not compel, the existence of large firms.

B. ERROR COST ANALYSIS

A second position that has more rhetorical appeal than factual support is that the best thing that antitrust can do in areas of uncertainty is nothing. As a result, antitrust policy should be invoked only against very egregious practices such as naked price-fixing. The fundamentals of this view were developed in the 1940s and 1950s by prominent Chicago School scholars such as George J. Stigler and Milton Friedman. The view migrated into the legal literature after it had largely become obsolete in economics, but it has proven to be very resilient, mainly because it brings profits to so many firms.

This idea, which goes by the name “error cost” analysis, begins with the premise that markets are robust and will naturally work themselves toward acceptable levels of competition. Judicial errors, by contrast, take a much longer time to correct. As a result, overdeterrence in antitrust is a much bigger problem than underdeterrence. Justice Gorsuch reflected this view during oral argument in the Amex case when he suggested that “judicial errors are a lot harder to correct than an occasional monopoly.” When we are in doubt, the best thing to do is nothing. Today, the right’s adherence to error cost analysis in spite of a forty-year-long explosion of economic evidence that undermines it, is one of the most important sources of capture in the private economy. Both of its premises are wrong. Far from working inevitably toward competition, the amount of monopoly in the economy has been increasing steadily since the 1980s. Further, judges are quite capable of overruling or limiting bad antitrust decisions, often in a timely fashion.


20. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1959), aff’d, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (“Company-owned and company-controlled retail stores have definite advantages in buying and credit; they have further advantages in advertising, insurance, inventory control and assists and price control. These advantages result in lower prices or in higher quality for the same price and the independent retailer can no longer compete . . . .”).


23. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (No. 16-1454) ("[W]hy shouldn’t we take Judge Easterbrook’s admonition seriously, that judicial errors are a lot harder to correct than an occasional monopoly where you can hope and assume that the market will eventually correct it? Judicial errors are very difficult to correct.").

C. BREAKING UP THE LARGE DIGITAL PLATFORM

A third error is thinking that the large digital platforms are inherently bad and that the only good way to fix the problem is to break them up. Enthusiasm for breakups has waxed and waned across the history of antitrust enforcement. Courts are not very good at restructuring firms. The risks that an imposed breakup will do more harm than good are significant. Bad breakups can cause considerable harm to consumers, labor, and other affected interests, often without solving the monopoly problem at hand.

However, not all “breakups” are alike. It is important to distinguish divestitures of acquired assets—that is, the undoing of mergers—from breaking off assets that were internally developed. Indeed, the unwinding of unlawful mergers has always been a well-established part of antitrust enforcement policy and remains so. The reason that we do much less of it today is a consequence of legislation passed in 1976 requiring most high-value mergers to be reported before they occur. The result is that legal challenges typically precede the actual acquisition, and no breakup ever occurs. If the government wins, the remedy is an injunction barring the merger.

The statute does not eliminate the right to challenge consummated mergers, and a few such cases do occur. Post-merger breakups are still an acceptable remedy for mergers that turn out later to be problematic. Whether a breakup is the best remedy depends in part on how well integrated the acquired firm’s assets are into the acquiring firm. For example, the FTC’s pending complaint against Facebook challenges its acquisitions of Instagram and Whatsapp several years after the acquisitions occurred despite the fact that they were reviewed and approved at the time. Both firms retain distinct platforms and customer subscriptions, however, and neither is fully integrated into Facebook’s main platform. Breaking them off from Facebook should be manageable, although it may require some sharing of user information.

By contrast, breaking up internally developed assets is more difficult, and there is a greater chance of error. However, even these can succeed. One case in point is the telephone system, broken into seven regional firms by an antitrust consent decree in 1982. That breakup was a policy success because it insisted on interoperability and thus preserved nearly all of the beneficial network effects.

of a unitary phone system. That consent decree should offer a playbook for antitrust regulators dividing Facebook from a spun-off firm such as Instagram.

An effective breakup must break into a monopoly, however, and not merely spin it off. For example, some have suggested that Alphabet, the parent of Google, should spin off Google Search. But if Google search is itself the monopoly, all that breakup will do is transfer the monopoly to a different owner. If a firm produces eighty percent of the market’s toasters and fifty percent of the market’s blenders, spinning off the blender division will simply give us one firm that continues to control eighty percent of the toasters and a second that controls fifty percent of the blenders. To break up the monopoly we need to divide toaster production. In most markets, and particularly digital ones, that is much more difficult to accomplish.

To be sure, one monopoly division in a firm may be able to cross-subsidize another division, but then we need to sort out how much of this is beneficial and how much is harmful. For example, in *Berkey Photo Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.*, the Second Circuit refused to condemn Kodak’s simultaneous introduction of a new camera and film cartridge that were compatible only with one another.\(^{31}\) The mere fact that one department in the firm “benefits from association” with another division that has monopoly power should not be unlawful.\(^{32}\) In this case, consumers found the new camera-film package so desirable that it swept the market. Further, in most cases, there are nonstructural alternatives such as injunctions that will work better. In *Berkey*, the plaintiff did not seek divestiture of Kodak’s film business, but only an order compelling Kodak to disclose technology in progress that might harm a rival.\(^{33}\) For example, Android handheld manufacturers have made Google Search the default search engine, but that practice was ended in the European Union by an injunction, not a breakup.\(^{34}\) The same thing could happen under United States law.

Simply breaking up firms without considering these effects can make a firm smaller but almost certainly not more attractive. For example, we might break Facebook into one firm exclusively for men and another exclusively for women, or perhaps into different firms for different geographic areas. Or we could divest video posting, or message boards, or some other feature. Removing features would make Facebook smaller, but it would also be crippling, not only for Facebook itself but also for its users, shareholders, employees, and suppliers. Indeed, the very features that make Facebook attractive also explain why it is large—namely, the ability to connect a very large network of members without

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31. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
32. *Id.* at 276.
33. See *id.* at 281 (reversing district court’s jury instruction that required a monopolist to pre-disclose whether its new technology made “it impossible for a competitor to compete with Kodak in the camera market unless it could offer products similar to Kodak’s.”).
significant restriction, and to offer an aggregated set of features that these members can use on demand in differing combinations.

There are more promising alternatives, although we have less experience with them. One is compelled “interoperability,” which has become a term for a decree that requires a dominant firm to share some operations or data with other firms. The grandparent of such remedies is the consent decree that broke up the telephone company,\(^{35}\) subsequently expanded by the 1996 Telecommunications Act,\(^{36}\) which permitted smaller phone carriers to interconnect with the dominant carriers. For more than a decade, interconnection was supervised by a single federal judge, Harold Greene.\(^{37}\) Then federal and state telecommunications agencies took over that task. The result was the creation of the national telephone network as we have it today, which has largely achieved the gold standard among networks: everyone can talk to everyone else.

Interoperability remedies could also be made to work in markets for things like ride-hailing services. For example, Uber and Lyft might be joined under a common app, and the two firms or their drivers could bid by posting their fares. The user of the app would select a car based on price, location, or other features. Making interoperability work in more complex situations like Facebook or consumer search engines would be more challenging but likely doable. Interconnection remedies are a particularly promising alternative on two-sided platforms with substantial direct and indirect network effects. Here, the network becomes more valuable as the number of users on both sides increases. Breakup remedies that interfere with that will not only make users worse off, but will also be unstable because they are not equilibrium solutions.

Other types of interoperability—although that term may be a misnomer—are also worth trying out. Full interoperability is “dynamic” in the sense that all covered firms participate in ongoing changes, which occur more or less simultaneously across all platforms. “Static” interoperability can also be effective at promoting competition. One example is data portability. Facebook limits users’ ability to switch away by making customer data nonportable. Overall, Facebook users face low switching costs, and there are few limits on their ability to switch to an additional or alternative networking site. As a user’s history of photos, videos, and other communications becomes larger and more valuable to that user, the cost of switching becomes higher. In his January 2022 decision sustaining the FTC’s complaint, Judge Boasberg described this as a barrier to entry resulting from high switching costs—correctly so.\(^{38}\) A form of

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35. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. at 222.
38. FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590-JEB, 2022 WL 103308, at *9 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“[T]he FTC advance[d] a modern variation on that well-established barrier to entry. It alleges that because a core purpose of personal social networking is to connect
relief worth considering is a requirement that data be stored in a commonly addressable and portable format that is controlled by the customer and transferable at will. This is not the same thing as full interoperability, which would mean that a customer’s changes on one platform would be automatically synched to appear on other platforms as well. Whatever the precise solution, fashioning it should begin with the premise that customers are the owners of their personal data.

An alternative with promise but no track record outside of voluntary arrangements is the reorganization of management rather than the firm itself. That is, if you cannot make the firm’s assets structurally more competitive, perhaps you can make its management more competitive. For example, suppose Amazon was reorganized under a board consisting of several competing Amazon market participants with separate businesses of their own. This board would have oversight over merchant selection and sales policies. Plenty of precedent exists for treating the decisions of corporations run by directors with independent businesses as agreements among directors’ separate businesses, rather than as the unilateral actions of the parent firm. Important Supreme Court decisions involving the Chicago Board of Trade, the Associated Press, and the NFL involved such structures. The Supreme Court had no difficulty treating their conduct as agreements among their members rather than unilateral conduct. Similar reasoning has been applied to hospital staff privileges boards and real estate associations whose members are active brokers. When the individual members collude with one another—even if stockholders in a common enterprise—section 1 of the Sherman Act can be brought to bear.

The significance is that collaborative conduct is treated under a much more aggressive standard than is unilateral conduct. The concerns shift toward agreements that reduce output and raise prices, rather than the strict standards that apply to monopolizing conduct. For example, unilateral refusals to deal are almost never unlawful under the antitrust laws, while concerted refusals can be. Purely vertical restrictions, such as most-favored-nation clauses requiring suppliers to discriminate against competitors, are subject to the rule of reason. However, if these restrictions are horizontal because they are imposed by agreement among a group of competitors, they can be unlawful per se. Even

and engage with personal connections, it is very difficult for a new entrant to displace an established personal social network in which users’ friends and family already participate. In other words, why would new users go to a social space that does not include their important contacts? (39)

40. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918) (describing the agreement among shareholders of an Illinois corporation).
43. E.g., Boczar v. Manatee Hosps. & Health Sys., Inc., 993 F.2d 1514, 1517 (11th Cir. 1993).
44. E.g., Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1144–47 (9th Cir. 2003).
under the rule of reason, however, the market power requirements under existing law are lower. Under such a structure, these practices would be much easier to reach, although they would still require a showing of competitive harm.\footnote{45}

D. SELF-PREFERENCING

Finally, a fourth position lies in the remedies contained in legislative proposals pending in Congress under the name “self-preferencing.”\footnote{46} This term refers to situations where a platform provides its own goods or services as well as the goods or services of others, and then somehow discriminates against the third parties. The legislation clearly targets Amazon, but it also has relevance for any covered platform that offers marketplaces for both its own services and those of others, or who engage with a range of suppliers or advertisers.

The idea is a complete misfire to the extent that it ignores that consumer switching is usually more costly in traditional brick-and-mortar stores. For example, a customer in a physical Wal-Mart store who is unhappy with Wal Mart’s preferencing of an in-house product over a rival brand’s product can switch by driving to a different store. By contrast, a customer unhappy with Amazon’s product selection can find alternatives with a mouse click. The damage done by these provisions would be limited if they contained a market power requirement, but as of this writing they appear not to. Rather, they are explicitly directed at platforms of a certain gross size. For example, Amazon is covered even though it has non-dominant market shares in most products that it sells, save a few items such as eBooks.\footnote{47}

As currently formulated, the pending self-preferencing legislation is an affront to both antitrust policy and intelligent regulatory policy. Indeed, it displays all the signs of special interest capture disguised as an antitrust law. Covered firms are chosen in a way designed to handicap a small number of digital firms for the benefits of smaller firms or those that are dedicated to older technologies.

A related concern is based on accusations that Amazon and perhaps other firms collect data on goods that it sells for third parties and then takes advantage of this data to engineer copies of these goods, typically selling them at a lower price.

About the worst solution for these problems is a structural separation rule. That would deprive customers of the benefits of intraplatform competition,

\footnotesize{45. The proposal is developed more fully in Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, supra note 28, at 2021–31.


47. See Sandy Smith, 2021 Top 100 Retailers, NAT’L RETAIL FED’N (July 6, 2021), https://nrf.com/blog/2021-top-100-retailers (indicating that Amazon holds less than ten percent of the retail market share even as it ranks second in a list of ten largest retailers in 2021).}
which is substantial on platforms such as Amazon, but also on others such as eBay. Amazon presents a rather different problem from the chain stores that provoked Louis Brandeis’s anger in the 1920s and 1930s.\textsuperscript{48} A big chain such as A&P largely sold its own goods in competition with smaller firms, who suffered greatly from the increased competition. By contrast, Amazon’s relationship with third-party sellers is as both competitor and broker, and it is important to segregate those roles.

Amazon’s sale of its own goods, through its house brands like AmazonBasics, affects rivals in a variety of ways. First, there is one set of small firms who choose not to sell on Amazon at all. They certainly face more competition, but they are not the target of these bills because they are already off the platform. Second are small firms that sell on Amazon and that may be vulnerable if Amazon manipulates its displays or terms, or reverse engineers its products. Third are large firms that have premium brands of their own. The largest dollar volume of AmazonBasics sales comes from selling products also sold by other large firms. These include goods like alkaline batteries, which Amazon sells in competition with brands such as Duracell, Eveready, or Energizer. Duracell is owned by Berkshire Hathaway, one of the largest firms in the country, but the other name brands are also large firms. A second large category is consumable office supplies, where Amazon’s principal competitor is 3M, another very large firm. A third is small electronic appliances such as toasters, where Amazon competes with Black & Decker, the largest maker of small appliances in the United States, and Cuisinart. A fourth is electronics cables, sold in competition with Anker and Belkin. For all of these, the impact of Amazon’s own product presence is clear: consumers have an additional choice, and the premium brand must cut its price or lose sales. The only entity that will benefit if Amazon is forbidden from selling AmazonBasics and Duracell batteries on the same website is Berkshire Hathaway.

This hardly means that antitrust is toothless. It just needs to search more carefully for competitive harm. One such harm is the platform-most-favored clause, which requires sellers to sell to others only at higher prices. Another is exclusive dealing, and there may be others that can be challenged under section 1 of the Sherman Act.

The final problem here is reverse engineering and knockoffs. The literature in this area is heavily anecdotal and focuses on relatively few instances,\textsuperscript{49} but clearly some exist. The problem raises several questions. First, is Amazon using information supplied by these third-party sellers that is not generally available? For example, anyone can purchase a product from Amazon and examine it or read Amazon’s own posted customer reviews in order to create a knockoff.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{48} See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541 (1933).
\end{footnotesize}
By contrast, sales figures may not be readily available. The current version of the Innovation and Choice Online Act\(^\text{50}\) limits coverage to situations where platforms use nonpublic data to inform their reverse engineering.\(^\text{51}\) Whether that describes a significant set of instances is doubtful.

Second, what about the role of intellectual property laws? If the products that Amazon is copying are protected by utility or design patents, copyrights, or trademarks, Amazon is guilty of infringement. If not, then the general policy of American law is to permit, or even encourage, copying things that are in the public domain. Witness, for example, the considerable enthusiasm we show for the ability to copy patented pharmaceutical drugs when their patents expire.

Once again, this is not to say that Amazon is not doing anything anticompetitive, but rather that this issue needs to be pursued more dispassionately, very likely with more precision in individual instances, and with more factfinding in order to determine which conduct is harmful and which is not.

**CONCLUSION**

One important feature of the digital economy is its lopsided contribution to the broader economy, with a growth rate as much as four times greater than that of the economy overall.\(^\text{52}\) This is true mainly because that part of the economy has provided both businesses and consumers with products and technologies that they value. It takes a special arrogance to deny this migration and substitute it for some version of a past that no longer exists.

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\(^{50}\) American Innovation and Choice Online Act, S. 2992, 117th Cong. (2021–2022).

\(^{51}\) *Id.* § 2(b)(3).
