UC Law Journal
Abstract
The United States offers immigration pathways based on economic contribution, yet this principle is applied inconsistently across employment-based (EB) visa preference categories. While the EB-1, EB-2, and EB-3 visas require immigrants to demonstrate exceptional ability, advanced education, or labor market necessity, the EB-5 investor visa grants permanent residency solely in exchange for capital. This Note argues that this inconsistency exposes a deeper flaw in U.S. immigration law: an incoherent and unequal definition of “economic value.” By treating capital as a sufficient basis for citizenship—without requiring skill, integration, or verifiable public benefit—the EB-5 program reveals how U.S. immigration policy privileges wealth over talent, labor, or civic contribution.
Through a critical analysis of the EB-5 program’s structure, a comparative study of employment-based and international investor visa systems, and a case study of the Jay Peak fraud scandal, this Note demonstrates that the United States has failed to articulate a coherent theory of economic value in migration policy. It concludes by proposing a redefinition of “economic contribution” that prioritizes measurable public benefit, direct skill transfer, and genuine developmental impact over mere financial transactions.
Recommended Citation
Saamia Aziz,
Capital Without Contribution,
77 UC Law SF L.J. 981
(2026).
Available at: https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol77/iss4/9